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Abstract
A farmer’s decision on whether to control a pest is usually based on the perceived threat of
the pest locally and the guidance of commercial advisors. Therefore, farmers in a region are
often influenced by similar circumstances, and this can create a coordinated response for
pest control that is effective at a landscape scale. This coordinated response is not inten-
tional, but is an emergent property of the system. We propose a framework for understand-
ing the intrinsic feedback mechanisms between the actions of humans and the dynamics of
pest populations and demonstrate this framework using the European corn borer, a serious
pest in maize crops. We link a model of the European corn borer and a parasite in a land-
scape with a model that simulates the decisions of individual farmers on what type of maize
to grow. Farmers chose whether to grow Bt-maize, which is toxic to the corn borer, or con-
ventional maize for which the seed is cheaper. The problem is akin to the snow-drift problem
in game theory; that is to say, if enough farmers choose to grow Btmaize then because the
pest is suppressed an individual may benefit from growing conventional maize. We show
that the communication network between farmers’ and their perceptions of profit and loss
affects landscape scale patterns in pest dynamics. We found that although adoption of Bt
maize often brings increased financial returns, these rewards oscillate in response to the
prevalence of pests.
Author Summary
A farmer’s decision on whether to control a pest is usually based on the perceived threat of
the pest locally and the guidance of commercial advisors. Therefore, farmers in a region
are often influenced by similar circumstances, and this can create a coordinated response
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to a pest. This coordinated response, although not intentional, can affect ecological sys-
tems at the landscape scale. Using the European corn borer as an exemplar system, we
develop a framework to explore the feedback mechanisms between pest populations and
farmers’ decisions. We show that the form of communication network and the farmers’
perceptions of profit and loss influence the decisions made on pest control. Our work has
implications for other systems, whereby the ecology of a system is driven by individual
decision makers following similar heuristics and experiencing similar influences. Indeed,
by understanding the feedback mechanisms between pest populations and farmers’ deci-
sions we can predict landscape-scale dynamics and determine how to manipulate these to
sustain control.
Introduction
The European corn borer (Ostrinia nubilalis) (ECB), a serious pest of maize, cost the American
economy an estimated 1 billion US dollars annually at its worst in the early 1990s [1, 2]. In
1996, Btmaize, a transgenic crop that expressed insecticidal proteins from the soil-dwelling
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, was introduced for control of the pest. Since then, farmers
have had to choose whether to plant conventional or Btmaize (Fig 1). Their decisions rest on
the economic viability of Bt, given that future infestations of ECB cannot be predicted. Specifi-
cally, farmers must predict whether increased returns from Bt will exceed the technology fee, a
financial premium for buying the transgenic seed [3, 4]. In some situations, farmers believe
that the economics favor conventional seed; more than half of them believe that the price of Bt
maize is too high to merit purchase [1, 5], particularly if their crops have not recently been
infested.
Fig 1. Influences on farmers’ decisions and their impacts. A schematic illustrating the influences on farmers' decisions on what varieties of maize to
grow, and how this impacts the population dynamics of the European corn borer and the profitability of farming at a landscape scale. The width of the green
arrows indicates the approximate appropriation of agricultural resources.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.g001
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Hutchison et al. [1] showed that Btmaize generated an estimated $230 million annual bene-
fit to maize growers in Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Much of this economic benefit
(75%) accrued to farmers who did not plant Btmaize; these farmers did not pay technology
fees but still benefitted from the area-wide suppression provided by those farmers who cooper-
ated to use Bt to reduce pest densities [1]. Other systems, such as cotton, have shown similar
benefits from area wide suppression of pests [6].
As such, the control of ECB can be evaluated through game theory because the mechanisms
of cooperation, such as reciprocity, reputation and spatial structure are embedded in the farmer
networks that mediate the population dynamics of the pest [7–10]. The system is akin to a
‘snow drift’ game [8]. The snow drift game is a metaphor for a situation whereby the benefit
that an individual, in this case a farmer, obtains for a given strategy depends on the actions of
others. In particular, if a farmer chooses to grow conventional maize in a landscape where the
pest is supressed by other farmers growing Btmaize, then this individual will benefit from the
pest suppression without paying the technology fee. On the other hand, in a situation where
the pest is not suppressed at landscape scale it is likely to be more profitable for an individual
to grow Btmaize.
When deciding whether to plant Btmaize, farmers negotiate between ‘expert’ and ‘local’
knowledge (Fig 1). For example, Kaup’s [5] hierarchy of influences showed maize-seed dealers
and crop consultants appeared to have substantial influence, neighbors had moderate influ-
ence, and extension agents had little influence on the farmers’ decisions to plant Btmaize.
More than 50% of farmers who anticipated having ECB problems chose to plant Btmaize. The
results emphasize an important principle in pest control: farmers’ perceived risks, rather than
actual losses, play an important role in pest management [5, 11, 12]. This principle of 'risk per-
ception' is crucial. If farmers’ underestimate the risk of infestation and grow conventional
maize then the pest will flourish and diminish yields. If on the other hand farmers exaggerate
the risk and plant too much Btmaize then there is an increased risk that the pest will adapt to
its new host and threaten the long-term production of maize.
Here we build a framework for exploring the intrinsic feedback mechanisms between the
actions of humans and the dynamics of pest populations in a structured landscape, and use the
European corn borer in maize as an example. Our example is intended to demonstrate the
plausibility of the framework and so is illustrative rather than predictive. Our models are kept
simple to both aid the elucidation of our results and to reduce the runtimes of the simulations.
This particular example was chosen because there is a rich source of data to support it. We
build a mechanistic model of the population dynamics of ECB in a 700-km long strip of the US
Corn Belt. The models are parameterised to reflect a maize system similar to that in the part of
the US Corn Belt that passes through Minnesota and Wisconsin. The model of the population
dynamics includes the life cycle, dispersal and ecology of the pest including its relationship
with the pathogen Nosema pyrausta (Microsporidia: Nosematidae), which is one of the most
important natural enemies of the ECB; this parasite reduces the number of surviving offspring,
and is cited as the primary reason for the observed cycle in the population density [13–16]. The
landscape model is spatially-explicit and parameterized so that one half has similar county
sizes, farm sizes, and density of maize crops to those in Minnesota and the other to those in
Wisconsin. We show how this model captures the behavior of the ECB-population dynamics
in the observed empirical data at a coarse spatial scale. Importantly, analysis of the model
shows that even when the infected population is reduced to small numbers, it retains the capac-
ity to recover and so the natural control persists.
We then introduce a sociological layer to the model. We simulate the processes by which
individual farmers decide whether to grow Btmaize or conventional maize. The decision is
based predominantly on likely profit: the probability that a farmer will chose a given strategy is
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based on the information that he or she has on the profits achieved under Btmaize and conven-
tional maize in recent seasons. For any given farmer, the source of this information will depend
on the network of communication. Here we explicitly model four different networks of commu-
nication. In particular we explore how the form of the network affects the uptake of Btmaize
over time, the pest population dynamics and the long term profits of the farmers in the land-
scape. We show that the form of the network impacts the feedback mechanism between pest
populations and farmers' decisions that affect landscape-scale dynamics. We show that indepen-
dent decision makers that follow similar heuristics and are influenced by the same circumstances
can create an apparent coordinated response which affects ecological systems at landscape scales.
This coordinated response is not intentional, but is an emergent property of the system.
Methods
Below we present the components of the model framework, including the pest dynamics
model, the farmer decision model and four different communication networks. We then use
this framework to explore the effect of the different communication networks and the respon-
siveness of the farmers to loss on (i) the pest dynamics, (ii) the uptake of Btmaize and (iii) the
long term losses of the farmers.
European corn borer andNosema pyraustamodel
We developed a model to explore the population dynamics of ECB and its natural enemy, the
pathogen Nosema pyrausta, and the impact of ECB on maize crops in a landscape. This land-
scape was based on national agricultural census statistics from 1997, 2002 and 2007 on county
sizes, farm sizes and numbers, harvested areas and the area of maize grown in Wisconsin and
Minnesota [17–19]. We used a grid of 300 x 1400 cells that equates to a 150km x 700km strip.
Each cell represents 25 ha (0.5km x 0.5km), similar to the typical size of maize fields in the
region. One half of the simulated landscape was parameterised to be similar to Wisconsin and
the other to Minnesota. We partitioned the two states into counties, with county sizes reflecting
the actual distribution of county sizes in each state. We defined farms as connected cells in
which arable crops could be grown. The number of farms in each simulated county, and the
distribution of their sizes, reflected the true distribution of arable land on farms in each state.
Simulated farms were fitted into the county, along with uncropped areas at random (see S1
Text). The landscape was generated stochastically and so is a realisation of a random process.
Crops were assigned county by county. On average, maize accounted for 44% of the cropped
area in Minnesota and 37% inWisconsin [17–19]. Cropped cells were then allocated at random
as maize or other. Each year, the proportion of maize in a given county was resampled, and
cropped cells allocated again at random to maize or other. This process allowed for a propor-
tion of fields to have maize crops grown consecutively and others to have rotations with a non-
host crop for ECB. We made the simplifying assumption that ECB only develops in grid cells
with maize. In each of these cells we use an abundance-based population model to describe the
development of a population of ECB that is susceptible to the pathogen N. pyrausta and one
that is infected. Our model did not include the effect of other natural enemies of ECB or cli-
mate, and so was not expected to accurately describe the historic dynamics of the ECB. Rather,
its purpose was to capture the population cycle attributed to N. pyrausta and to simulate the
effect of Btmaize on larval survival.
In the model, eggs hatch into larvae that pass through five instar stages. The survival of the
larvae through to pupation is density dependent. We assume that the Bt toxin reduces the
number of larvae that reach instar 3 by 99.9% [20]. We do not consider insecticides as a control
measure as these are considered largely ineffective because after the neonate stage, the ECB
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larvae are concealed within the maize plant, thus avoiding direct contact with an insecticide's
active ingredients. Adults emerge following pupation, then disperse and mate, and then females
disperse before oviposition and the cycle starts again. We assume two generations of ECB per
year, as is typical in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The larvae from the second generation over-
winter in stalks, and so their survival rate is lower than that of the first generation. Infection by
N. pyrausta travels through both horizontal and vertical pathways. We assume that infected
adult males do not pass infection to their young, but that females pass on infection to 85% of
their eggs [21]. Infection passes horizontally through the population during the larvae stage
when susceptible (uninfected) larvae come into contact with frass from infected larvae. The
infection rate is modelled as density dependent. The survival of the infected population at each
stage is smaller than the healthy population. The parameter values of the model were based on
the body of work by Onstad and colleagues [12, 21, 22] (see S2 Text for full model description).
We modelled the dispersal of the populations in four stages: pre-mating dispersal, mating,
post-mating dispersal of females, and oviposition. The dispersal functions represent the inte-
gration of the movement of moths over a period of days. The dispersal of insects is often mod-
elled with an exponential dispersal kernel which has a mode at the origin. The literature [23–
24] suggest that in the case of the corn borer, however, this may not be appropriate as instinct
and environmental factors force large numbers of adults from their natal fields. For this reason,
and for computational efficiency we chose to model dispersal using a beta distribution, which
has a flexible mode. We assume dispersal is the same in all directions, and that at the boundary
of the landscape the moths are reflected back.
We base our dispersal estimates on observations in the literature which demonstrate seasonal
differences in the dispersal of spring and summer adults [23–26]. Crop rotation and lack of ade-
quate humidity in crops during the day time can force newly emerged adults to move from their
overwintering field before initiating sexual activity [27]. The probability density function (PDF)
that describes the pre-mating dispersal in spring has a mode of 10km and 90% of the population
travelling less than 30 km. The dispersal of infected moths is reduced by 80%. Dispersal in sum-
mer is more conservative with a mode of 1km and 90% of the adult moths fly less than 15km.
Under typical conditions, the pre-oviposition period has a mean of 3.6 days [14]. Thereafter the
mean oviposition period is approximately 10 days with oviposition decreasing with time. During
this time a female could cover a considerable area. We assumed that for spring the mode of the
post-mating PDF was 35 km and that 90% of the population travel less than 60 km, and that in
summer the mode was 5 km with 90% of the population traveling less than 30 km (see Fig 2).
The model of the ECB population density expresses the cycle of infestation caused by N. pyr-
austa observed in the field data with a similar wavelength [2]. When Bt was introduced into the
landscape, the cycle collapsed and the pest was suppressed in a way similar to observed patterns
[2] (Fig 3).
Modelling the decision process
In the model, farmers growing maize face the decision of whether to plant Bt or conventional
maize. As described above, the decisions on which type of maize to grow directly impacts the
survival of the ECB larvae and so the population dynamics of the pest. Kaup [5] surveyed 4000
farmers in Wisconsin and Minnesota and found that the most common reasons for growing Bt
maize were: (i) to increase yield; (ii) to control insects better; and (iii) they anticipated ECB
problem. The most common reasons for not using Btmaize were (i) the price of Bt seed was
too high; or (ii) no ECB problem was anticipated. Although growers may misconceive the
financial impact of the drivers described above, these drivers imply a profit-based decision.
Other factors including farm size, age, education and available market information have been
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shown to influence the adoption of GM crops and complex empirical models have been pro-
posed to describe these effects on farmer decisions [28]. To both ensure the easy interpretation
of our results, we chose to use a simple model based on perceived profit.
We assumed that the decision process is driven by the financial impact of ECB, and that
farmers make decisions based on recent years’ experience [5]. We used data fromWisconsin
and Minnesota on the estimated benefit ($ ha−1) from Btmaize and the increase in the area of
Btmaize grown (as a percentage of total maize grown) between 1995 and 2009 to model the
probability (p) of farmers changing cropping strategy (Hutchison et al., [1]). The following
exponential function was used based on empirical and theoretical considerations:
p ¼ 1 exp½bðrA  rFÞ where rA > rF
p ¼ 0 otherwise: ð1Þ
Here β is a parameter, rF is the reward the farmer perceives was attained under the chosen strat-
egy and rA is the reward the farmers perceives would have been attained under the alternative
strategy, so that the difference rA−rFmeasures the perceived net beneﬁt for Btmaize adoption.
This model is not only more parsimonious than a more traditional logistic model, but also has
better goodness of ﬁt criteria (see S1 Fig). Furthermore, the exponential model is a constant
absolute risk aversion utility function for the representative farmer with parameters estimated
to ﬁt the observed state-level Btmaize adoption data and estimated beneﬁt [29, 30]. The
parameter β quantiﬁes farmer responsiveness to the perceived gain from Btmaize adoption (or
equivalently, ECB loss). The regression estimate for β was 0.0055 with a standard error of
0.00174 with no evidence to support separate parameters for each state. In practice it would be
Fig 2. The functions used tomodel the dispersal of the European corn borer. The dispersal functions for adult moths pre- and post- mating in spring and
summer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.g002
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possible to inﬂuence farmer responsiveness (i.e. β) through subsidy, taxation or education. For
example if farmers were encouraged to be cautious about returning to conventional maize then
farmers growing Btmaize would be less responsive when they experienced an apparent beneﬁt
reduction. We used the ﬁtted value ± three standard errors to deﬁne the range of values for β
that we explored in our analysis.
For each season, we sample an individual farmer’s decision from a distribution whereby the
probability of changing strategy is p (as defined in Eq 1). This allows us to implicitly include a
range of individual behaviors from the intransigent farmer who finds a preferred strategy and
will not change, to the receptive farmer who will try new practices. It also implicitly includes
other social factors which we do not explicitly account for.
Fig 3. Overwintering larvae. Average numbers of overwintering lavae fromMinnesota over time (solid black line) during a period where the proportion of Bt
maize broadly increased (dashed red line). Our simulation model (solid blue line) captures the behavior observed in the field with a cycle in the population of
similar wavelength to that observed in the data. The introduction of Btmaize results in this cycle being damped but still persisting (the cycle is under-damped
in this case—see S2 Text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.g003
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The farmer’s reward is given by the average financial reward from his maize fields calculated as
r ¼ ðY  YLÞmP  F; ð2Þ
where Y is the expected yield in a ECB-free crop (t ha−1), YL is the loss in yield due to the ECB (t
ha−1),mp is the crop price ($ t
−1) and F is the technology fee ($), which is the seed price difference
between conventional and Btmaize. We do not include varietal effects that could modify yields
slightly, but assume that all maize crops have the same expected yield (10 t ha−1). We assume that
this yield is reduced by ECB according to the function given in the supplementary information of
Hutchison et al., [1]:
YL ¼ Y
0:021ð2:56x þ 5:65 ﬃﬃﬃxp Þ1:16
½ð2:56x þ 5:65 ﬃﬃﬃxp Þ2 þ ð3:4þ 1:73xÞ20:29 ; ð3Þ
where x is the average number of overwintering larvae per plant. To be consistent with the data
used to parameterise the landscape model we assume F = 16 $ ha−1 and a crop price (mp) of 99 $
t−1 which are averages for Minnesota andWisconsin between 1996 and 2009 [1].
Communication networks
Given that we can calculate the reward (r) for growing maize in any particular field we must
consider how to calculate the reward the farmer perceives was attained under each strategy (i.e.
rF and rA). The reward for a given strategy may be calculated from the rewards obtained for
this strategy over a given area of the landscape, i.e. a farmer’s perceived reward depends on the
network of communication and how much credence the farmer gives to the information avail-
able to them. Kaup [5] showed that growers who had reported an insect problem in one year
were likely to grow Btmaize in the next, which is consistent with farmers who grow other Bt
crops [31]. In Kaup’s study the state-reported insect levels did not significantly influence
behavior. Therefore we assume that a farmer perceives that the reward for their chosen strategy
(rF) is given by the average reward from across their fields, taking no account of the success of
that strategy in their neighborhood.
To inform on the perceived reward from the alternative strategy we consider four networks
of communication that we shall refer to as: (i) landscape-network; (ii) neighbor-network; (iii)
Kaup-network and (iv) varying-response-network. There are two theoretical extremes: the first
is where each farmer has information from across the whole landscape, akin to accessing web-
based crop data. In this scenario the perceived reward for the alternative strategy is the average
of the rewards for the alternative strategy across the landscape. We call this the ‘landscape-net-
work’. The second is where each farmer has information only from farms that neighbor their
own, which may reflect how traditional farming decisions are made alone or within coopera-
tives. In this scenario the reward for the alternative strategy is given by the average reward that
this strategy attains in farms that neighbor the farmer. We call this the ‘neighbor-network’.
Research shows that when farmers decide which varieties to grow they may consult family
and friends, other farmers, commercial newsletters, county extension agents and university
specialists. Kaup [5] reports that 40.2% of farmers acknowledged that a major reason to grow
Bt was that it was recommended by their seed dealers or consultants. Similarly 7.9% of farmers
acknowledged recommendation by a neighbor, and 3.4% acknowledged recommendation by
university or extension agencies. Normalizing these percentages to sum to 100%, we simulate a
communication network whereby a farmer has a probability of 0.78 of being influenced by a
consultant, a probability 0.15 of being influenced by a neighbour and a probability of 0.07 of
being influenced by a university. According to those probabilities each farm is assigned a com-
munication network type. For those assigned to be neighbor-influenced we calculate the
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reward of the alternative strategy by averaging the scores of this strategy from farms within
1km. We assume consultants operate over a county, and so for farmers assigned to be consul-
tant-influenced we calculated the reward as the average reward across a county. Finally we
assume universities operate at the state level and so the reward for those assigned to be univer-
sity-influenced is given by the average reward across the state. This network, which we refer to
as the ‘Kaup-network’, is arguably more common in today's farming environment than the two
former scenarios. For each network we set the responsiveness parameter β (Eq 1) to 0.0055,
0.0003 and 0.0108, which are the value fitted to the data, and that value ± three standard errors.
Kaup [5] showed that if farmers had planted Bt in the past then they were more likely to use
it in the future. This tendency is incorporated into the model by scaling β in Eq (1) so that
farmers who have used Btmaize in the past are more responsive to loss of profit. Our final net-
work, the ‘varying-response-network’, incorporates a reluctance for farmers to change back
from Bt-maize to conventional maize. It assumes a Kaup-network with the probability of a
farmer switching to Btmaize, having previously tried it given by Eq (1) with β = 0.0055 other-
wise β = 0.0003.
Implementing the model
We ran each simulation for 100 seasons. At the end of each season the reward rF(i) is calculated
for each farm i along with the perceived reward for the alternative strategy rA(i). The probabil-
ity that the farm strategy will change is calculated according to the farmer’s responsiveness to
loss. This probability is used to determine if they change strategy. Crops are rotated and fields
growing maize are assigned to Bt or conventional maize according to the calculated strategy.
Results
Analysis of the European corn borer and Nosema pyraustamodel
To explore the behavior of the solutions of the model we considered the equations without the
spatial component. Ignoring dispersal, the model equations (listed in S2 Text) reduce to the fol-
lowing set of difference equations:
~SðtÞ ¼ aðSðtÞ þ cPðtÞÞe
aPðtÞ
nþ SðtÞ þ PðtÞ
~PðtÞ ¼ k½PðtÞ þ bðSðtÞ þ cPðtÞÞð1 e
aPðtÞÞ
nþ SðtÞ þ PðtÞ
Sðt þ 1Þ ¼ o1
að~SðtÞ þ c~PðtÞÞea~PðtÞ
nþ ~SðtÞ þ ~PðtÞ
Pðt þ 1Þ ¼ o2
k½~PðtÞ þ bð~SðtÞ þ c~PðtÞÞð1 ea~PðtÞÞ
nþ ~SðtÞ þ ~PðtÞ
ð4Þ
where S(t) and P(t) represent the number of susceptible and infected eggs in year t, for the ﬁrst
generation respectively and ~SðtÞ and ~PðtÞ are for the second generation. The ﬁrst pair of equa-
tions describes the summer generation and the second pair the autumn-spring generation.
Many of the parameters result from combinations of biologically meaningful parameters from
the full model (see S2). Parameters a = 929.8 and k = 85.6 capture the population increase from
births modulated by survival rates for susceptible and healthy populations respectively. Param-
eter c = 0.15 is the proportion of susceptible eggs produced by an infected female. The term
(1−e−αP(t)) determines the proportion of the healthy population that becomes infected, where
α = 0.72 controls the infection transfer from the infected to susceptible population. Parameter
A Billion Dollar Game of Strategy
PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483 December 31, 2015 9 / 18
b = 2.31 relates to the survival of this recently infected population. The carrying capacity
parameter ν = 130.7 controls the density dependent survival of the larvae, parameters ω1 =
0.081 and ω2 = 0.02835 relate to the overwintering survival of the susceptible and infected pop-
ulations respectively.
Analysis of these equations shows three steady-states, i.e. solutions where the rates of change
of healthy population (S) and the infected population (P) are zero: (C1) [P = 0, S = 0], (C2)
[P = 0, S ¼ a2o1n2
aþn ], and (C3) [P
 = P0, S = S0], where both P0 and S0 are positive real values.
Linearization around these points determines the behavior of the solutions of the equations
[32]. The ﬁrst steady-state (C1) relates to the trivial solution whereby both healthy and infected
populations become extinct; the second (C2) relates to the solution where the infected popula-
tion becomes extinct; and the third steady-state (C3) relates to the solutions where both the
healthy and the infected population densities are larger than zero and the total population
cycles. It can be shown that (C3) exists, implying that N. pyrausta survives in the system, for
parameter combinations such that
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
o2
p kþabS^
nþS^
 
> 1, where S^ ¼ a2o1n2
aþn . For the model parame-
ters used, and a wide range around these parameters, the steady-state (C3) always exists sup-
porting the hypothesis that even if ECB is suppressed to low levels, the infected population will
survive and the natural control given by N. pyrausta persists.
The snow-drift game
Under the landscape-network simulation shown in Fig 4a and 4b, the percentage of Btmaize
oscillates between approximately 1% and 95% over time. Larval populations are driven by the
Bt adoption and oscillate similarly, with the largest levels prior to the maxima in the Bt cycle.
Increasing farmer responsiveness to economic loss (i.e. increasing the parameter β in Eq 1)
increases the frequency and amplitude of the oscillation; reducing farmer responsiveness
reduces the frequency and amplitude of the oscillation. The average larval density is held near
or below the economic threshold (0.06 larvae per plant for the model parameterization
reported here), however, in some parts of the landscape the density was much higher. The
results from the Kaup-network are similar to the landscape-network, but with a slightly higher
oscillation frequency and slight dampening (see S2 Fig).
In the neighbor network the solution slowly converges to a state where the proportion of Bt
maize is approximately 0.67 in Minnesota and 0.24 in Wisconsin (Fig 4c). The difference in
adoption rate results because the neighborhood connections are stronger in Minnesota than in
Wisconsin due to a greater density of farms in Minnesota. Indeed, in the simulated Wisconsin
landscape, more farms are likely to be isolated and so have no neighbors growing Btmaize to
compare profits with (see Fig 5a). Simulated ECB populations in Minnesota are lower than
those in Wisconsin, where adoption of Btmaize was smaller (Fig 4d). Fig 5b shows the average
number of overwintering larvae per plant in each cell for a single year of the simulation. The
average numbers of larvae in Wisconsin reach larger levels, and even for isolated farms in Min-
nesota the pest is supressed by the larger amount of Btmaize grown in the surrounding area.
For example between years 30 and 50 of the simulation shown in Fig 4 the maximum number
of ECB in any cell was 8.12 larvae per plant for Wisconsin and 2.69 for Minnesota. The respon-
siveness of the farmer to loss (parameter β) affects the convergence rate with smaller values of
β taking longer to converge.
Results from the simulation where farmers were more responsive to loss from conventional
maize if they had experience of growing Btmaize (varying-response-network simulations) are
shown in Fig 4e and 4f. The simulation illustrates that adoption of Btmaize is more rapid than
that of conventional maize.
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Table 1 lists the average losses ($ ha−1 year−1) across the landscape between year 20 and 100
under each simulation, and the average proportion of the maize that is Bt. Initial years were
excluded to allow the simulation to stabilize. Losses (L) were calculated from a baseline
whereby conventional maize was grown in an ECB-free landscape, i.e., L = YLmp+F, where YL
Fig 4. Results from the landscape-network, neighbor-network, and varying-response-network simulations. The top pane of each pair shows the
proportion of Btmaize and bottom panes show the average number of overwintering larvae per plant across the two areas of the landscape, one in Wisconsin
and the other in Minnesota. The simulation was started with 1% of the maize as Bt distributed randomly in the landscape.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.g004
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is the yield loss caused by the ECB,mp is the crop price and F is the technology fee. These
results are based on 10 realisations of each simulation. The average proportions of Btmaize are
similar across the networks ranging between 0.41 (when β = 0.0108) and 0.67 (when β =
0.0003). The standard deviation of the proportions of Btmaize were generally smaller for the
less responsive farmers (β = 0.0003). For the values β considered, mean losses are least in the
varying-response-network scenario and greatest in the neighbor-network scenario. We also
simulated losses under scenarios where the proportion of Bt in the landscape was fixed at a
given proportion, with the smallest simulated losses averaging 11 $ ha−1 year−1 with a propor-
tion of Bt of 0.61. The sensitivity of our results to model assumptions is discussed in S3 Text.
Fig 5. The spatial distribution of crops and larvae in a single year of the simulation. (a) The land use in year 73 of simulated landscape under the
neighbor-network. The left half of the landscape represents Minnesota (abscissa from 0 to 350 km) and the right Wisconsin (abscissa from 350 to 700 km);
(b) shows the corresponding average number of overwintering larvae per plant. Enlarged sections show the spatial distributions in more detail.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.g005
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Comparison of the dynamics of farmer behaviour with data
To test the plausibility of the results from our model, we compared the observed and simulated
dynamics of the relationships between loss incurred by growing conventional maize (calculated
as above) and the percentage of maize that was Bt (Fig 6). The relationship between these two
variables changes year on year depending on the corn borer population in the landscape. The
dynamics observed in the data from Minnesota and the simulations for the varying-response-
network are broadly similar (Fig 6a and 6e). The percentage of Btmaize grown increases until
it is not profitable to grow Bt, then farmers start to move back to conventional maize only to
return to Btmaize as losses increase later. The period of dis-adoption shown in Fig 6a is
unlikely to be solely driven by the farmers’ perceptions of loss from corn borer infestation as it
coincides with a period where there was a drop in confidence for the marketability of Btmaize,
however our analysis gives support to the hypothesis that farmers’ perceptions of loss might
explain dynamics. The Minnesotan data shows a second small drop in adoption over a two
year period when the losses reach −13 $ ha−1 thereafter there is a steady increase in the percent-
age of Btmaize grown with no relationship to loss. Observed dynamics for Wisconsin show
slower uptake of Btmaize compared with Minnesota (Fig 6b). This may reflect the fact that
maize is grown on a much larger scale in Minnesota compared to other states including Wis-
consin, which in turn may have implications for the way in which information is shared and
how fields are managed in these states [33]. Similar to the neighbor network we also see that
levels of Btmaize that initially control losses are subsequently less effective at the landscape
scale and so the use of Bt is increased. No ECB resistance to Btmaize has been reported and so
these changes in loss result from other factors such as climate or N. pyrausta.
Discussion
Liu et al. [34] highlighted the importance of linking sociological influences to ecological sys-
tems. In our simulation we show how economic conditions can result in the suppression of a
pest throughout a landscape. Our results accord with the findings of Bell et al. [2] who observed
the impact of a coordinated response to ECB, and showed the planting of Btmaize in Minne-
sota led to a collapse in the cycle of ECB caused by N. pyrausta. In Wisconsin, however, where
less Btmaize was grown, the cycle persisted. Similarly, Hutchison et al. [1] showed that farmers
who grew conventional maize benefited from the area-wide suppression from Btmaize in the
Table 1. The average losses and the average proportion of the crop that is Bt between year 20 and
100 under each simulation according to communication network type and value of the parameter β,
which changes the responsiveness of the farmer to loss. The standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
Network type Value of β Loss/$ ha−1 year−1 Proportion of Bt
Landscape-network 0.0003 15.63 (0.182) 0.67 (0.073)
0.0055 14.28 (0.302) 0.45 (0.319)
0.0108 14.02 (0.216) 0.51 (0.312)
Neighbor-network 0.0003 30.02 (0.420) 0.50 (0.045)
0.0055 27.51 (0.548) 0.51 (0.043)
0.0108 27.64 (0.749) 0.50 (0.039)
Kaup-network 0.0003 17.15 (0.132) 0.58 (0.089)
0.0055 16.12 (0.141) 0.43 (0.304)
0.0108 15.96 (0.278) 0.42 (0.275)
Varying-response-network – 13.90 (0.285) 0.56 (0.088)
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.t001
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region. Our model shows a similar phenomenon, particularly exemplified in the neighbor-net-
work simulation where a smaller proportion of Btmaize in Wisconsin resulted in a larger den-
sity of ECB compared with Minnesota, so that ECB population density continued to exhibit the
N. pyrausta driven cycle. The landscape scale effects of the decisions made by individuals have
been observed in other agricultural systems in which farmers’ decisions are influenced by social
Fig 6. The loss in profit incurred by growing conventional maize compared with growing Btmaize plotted against the percentage of maize that is
Bt. The arrow indicates the direction of time. Subplots (a) and (b) are based on data from states in the Corn Belt and subplots (c) to (e) are based on
simulations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004483.g006
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or economic factors or both and appear to be coordinated. The farmers’ behaviors results in
substantial impacts on the population dynamics of species across landscapes. For example,
Bianchi et al. [35] reported that coordinated changes in landscape composition negatively
impact natural pest control, and Klein et al. [36] showed how agricultural intensification
threatens wild bee pollination services at the landscape scale.
In our example, we show that decisions made by farmers on an individual basis impact ECB
populations and the profitability of growing maize in the landscape. These decisions are driven
by a range of external influences, from the advice of neighbors to information from extension
specialists. We showed that the form of the network and the farmer responsiveness to loss sub-
stantially impact the dynamics of the system at all trophic levels. Generally we found that Bt-
maize adoption oscillated in response to the prevalence of ECB in the landscape, and that the
communication network and responsiveness of the farmer to loss influenced the amplitude
and frequency of this oscillation. As the scale of communication networks increased so did the
rate at which change occurred. This phenomenon was observed by Lambin et al. [37] who
reported that rapid land-use changes often result when global influences replace local drivers.
For example the global markets demand for certain commodities may rapidly change land-
scapes from longstanding diverse land-use patterns to more uniform cropping.
Of the networks we considered, the varying-response-network performed the best in terms
of minimising losses and showed a reasonably constant proportion of Btmaize grown across
time (Table 1). The farmers in this simulation had good access to information from across the
landscape and were quicker to re-adopt Btmaize at the first sign of losses from ECB, yet slower
to return to the more risky strategy of growing conventional maize. Importantly, our simula-
tions show that to avoid extreme events some resistance to change must be inherent in the sys-
tem. The varying-response-network did not outcompete the simulation with a fixed percentage
of 61% Btmaize however. This outcome is compatible with the initial US-EPA resistance man-
agement requirements for ECB of at least 20% non-Btmaize planted each year, to serve as a ref-
uge to maintain non-Bt selected susceptible moths in the landscape [1].
One aspect that we did not consider is that seed companies use market power to protect
against the sales of Btmaize oscillating by selling the ECB-Btmaize seed bundled with other
desirable seed traits and by reducing ECB-Btmaize prices so that farmers continue to buy the
ECB-Bt-maize [38]. Similarly, seed dealers may promote Btmaize seed over conventional
because they themselves receive a better rate of commission for Btmaize. The effect of such
actions would be to inflate the reward farmers perceive is obtained from growing Btmaize, and
so increase the adoption of Btmaize and drive the trajectories shown in Fig 6 to the right. Indeed
any volatility in the price of seed or the harvested crop will impact the dynamics of the system.
Increases in the price of maize or a reduction in the technology fee result would result in a lower
tolerance to corn borer larvae. Another area not included in our analysis is the effect of farmer
decisions on the evolution of resistance ECB to Btmaize. A recent review by Tabashnik et al.
[39] found no evidence of a decrease in the susceptibility of ECB to Cry1Ab in Btmaize in the
field. Others have used modelling to evaluate the effect of refuge planting strategies and includ-
ing two or more toxins within a cultivar (pyramided toxins) on the rate of resistance evolution
[22, 40–42]. These studies aim to guide regulatory policy designed to mitigate the threat of resis-
tance. It is generally held that the greater the density of Btmaize in the landscape the faster the
evolution of resistance. It follows that within the context of farmer behaviour, social factors that
increase the use of Btmaize in the landscape would increase the rate of the evolution of resis-
tance. Increased resistance of ECB to Btmaize would in turn result in farmers seeking alterna-
tive methods of control perhaps in the form of new toxins, or cropping strategies.
Our work has implications for other systems, whereby the ecology of a system is driven by
individual decision makers following similar heuristics and experiencing similar influences.
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Examples include important systems where co-ordinated control can result in area-wide sup-
pression of a pest or diseases. These systems typically involve insect pests that either cause dam-
age to crops by herbivory (e.g.Meligethes aeneus F, Spodoptera exempta Walker) or act as a
vector for disease [43]. The model framework presented here also has application to other areas
such as disease prevention in a public health setting. There are clear parallels between landscape
suppression of pests and diseases, and the herd immunity afforded when sufficient numbers of
the population vaccinate. A number of modelling studies have been done to explore behaviour
in the context of vaccination to try to understand the conditions that cause vaccine coverage to
fall [44–46]. The conceptual difference between the vaccination studies and our study is that in
our study the host of the insect pest is fixed in space and the insect moves across space, whereas
in the case of human diseases the hosts move and transmit disease to one another. Our decision
model was based on the farmers’ perceived profits. However, other social factors such as per-
ceived food safety, the threat to non-target species and resistance management can effect deci-
sions [47]. These factors often do manifest as economic factors but where they do not, they
could be included in a model framework such as the one described by using opinion dynamics
models [48]. Vaccination uptake is an example of a situation where often decisions are based on
a perception of the safety rather than financial incentives (44). By understanding the dynamics
of farmer decisions we can determine how to manage better the system, through improved com-
munication, subsidy or taxation, to achieve robust and cost effective area-wide control, while
minimizing the risk of the evolution of resistance to control strategies.
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